Topics – Digital platforms and electronic-services pre 1 January 2015
C-101/24 XYRALITY
On 10 April 2025 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered the opinion of Advocate General Szpunar (AG) in this German referral asking, where a German taxable person (developer) supplied, before 1 January 2015, a service by electronic means to non-taxable persons established within the EU, via a marketplace for applications operated by an Irish taxable person, is Article 28 of the VAT Directive to be applied, with the result that the Irish taxable person is treated as if it had received those services from the developer and supplied them to the end customers, because the marketplace for applications did not name the developer as the supplier of the service and show German VAT until it did so in the order confirmations issued to the end customers? If the first question referred is answered in the affirmative: Is the place of supply of the fictitious service supplied by the developer to the marketplace for applications under Article 28 in Ireland, by virtue of Article 44 or in the Federal Republic of Germany, by virtue of Article 45? If, by virtue of the answers to the first and second questions referred, the developer has not supplied any services in the Federal Republic of Germany: is the developer subject to a tax liability for German VAT under Article 203 on the ground that the marketplace for applications, acting in accordance with an agreement, named the developer as the supplier of the service and showed German VAT in the order confirmations it sent by email to the end customers, even though the end customers are not entitled to deduct input VAT?
In essence, this case concerns the taxation of ‘in-application purchases’ effected during the years from 2012 to 2014, in which Article 9a of Implementing Regulation No 282/2011 was not yet applicable. Article 9a, effective from 1 January 2015, provides that for the application of Article 28 of the VAT Directive, where electronically supplied services are supplied through a telecommunications network, an interface or a portal such as a marketplace for applications, a taxable person taking part in that supply shall be presumed to be acting in his own name but on behalf of the provider of those services unless that provider is explicitly indicated as the supplier by that taxable person and that is reflected in the contractual arrangements between the parties.
To regard the provider of electronically supplied services as being explicitly indicated as the supplier of those services by the taxable person, the following conditions must be met:
- The invoice issued or made available by each taxable person taking part in the supply of the electronically supplied services must identify such services and the supplier thereof
- The bill or receipt issued or made available to the customer must identify the electronically supplied services and the supplier thereof
For the purposes of this paragraph, a taxable person who, with regard to a supply of electronically supplied services, authorises the charge to the customer or the delivery of the services, or sets the general terms and conditions of the supply, shall not be permitted to explicitly indicate another person as the supplier of those services.
The applicant is a taxable person established in Germany who develops and distributes game applications for mobile devices. For distribution purposes, it uses, inter alia, an internet-based digital distribution platform for software (referred to as a marketplace for applications). The marketplace for applications was operated by Ireland-based X until 31 December 2014. During the years at issue, end customers who used mobile devices with a specific operating system were able to download the applicant’s game applications solely via the marketplace for applications.
During that period X entered into standardised agreements, governing the distribution of products via the marketplace for applications, with developers such as the applicant. Those agreements stipulated that the sellers of the products offered through the marketplace for applications were their developers. X was to display the products on behalf of the developers and make them available for the end customers to download and purchase. X was to receive a commission in return for providing those services. The payment transaction was to be processed via the marketplace for applications.
During the years at issue, various downloadable game applications were available to the end customers in the marketplace for applications. The vast majority of those games did not originate from X but rather from the designers themselves. When presented in the marketplace for applications, the name of the developer was also displayed for each game. During the years at issue, the applicant appeared in the marketplace for applications and its company name, legal form and address were displayed.
Although the game applications developed by the applicant could be downloaded free of charge from the marketplace for applications, it was necessary for the end customer to purchase improvements or other benefits (in-application purchases) in order to advance in the game or obtain other benefits. The end customers were able to select the desired improvements or benefits in the applicant’s game application and have them activated for a fee.
The in-application purchases were processed via the marketplace for applications by means of a method of payment saved there by the end customer. The applicant was not named as the supplier in the course of the purchase transaction. Only X’s logo and certain links were visible. Upon completion of the purchase process, the end customer received an order confirmation from X by email. That email contained the logo of the marketplace for applications and a statement that the purchase was transacted with the relevant developer (in this case, the applicant) in the marketplace for applications.
The applicant initially regarded itself as the supplier to the end customers. It therefore declared German VAT for end customers based in the EU, on the ground that the place of supply was, pursuant to domestic law and Article 45 of the VAT Directive, its place of establishment.
On 29 January 2016, the applicant submitted corrected VAT returns for the years at issue. It was now of the opinion that this was a case in which services were ‘commissioned’ (Article 28 of the VAT Directive). It had provided its services to X, and X had provided the services to the end customers. Pursuant to domestic legislation and Article 44 of the VAT Directive, the place of supply of its services to X was in Ireland.
The tax authority disagreed and asserted that X was merely to be regarded as an intermediary. Whilst the respective purchase process took place via the marketplace for applications, the end customers were made aware of the terms of use at each individual step of the in-application purchase. X had thus clearly informed the end customers in the course of each purchase that the transactions were being executed on behalf a third party and that X was merely collecting the amount owed.
On appeal, the Finance Court upheld the action brought by the applicant. It considered that the transactions were not taxable in Germany because the recipient of its services was X. According to domestic legislation and Article 44, the place of supply was in Ireland.
Firstly, considering the interpretation of Article 28, as effective during the relevant period, the AG recalled that a taxable person acting on behalf of another is considered the supplier of a service, creating a legal fiction of two consecutive service supplies: the intermediary receives services from the principal and provides them to the end user. This inverses their roles for VAT purposes, suggesting a specific interpretation for electronically provided services involving intermediaries like app stores. An intermediary acting in the manner is sometimes referred to as an ‘undisclosed agent’.
However, withholding the identity of the principal is not a condition for the application of Article 28, the fact that the app developer is known to end users does not preclude the app store from being considered an intermediary acting in the manner provided for in that provision.
The AG noted that there is nothing in the wording of Article 28 to indicate that its application is conditional on the identity of ‘another person’ on whose behalf the intermediary acts being kept secret. Second, the Court explicitly ruled out that requirement for the application of the provision in question in the judgment in Fenix International.
The AG considered that the fact that the end users are informed, either before or after the service is provided, of the identity of the application developer, does not preclude the application of Article 28.
As to whether a taxable person is acting in his own name, the Court has ruled that this was for the national court to determine on the basis of all the available information, including, in particular, the contractual relations between the taxable person and its customers. However, it should be noted that those statements of the Court refer to Article 9a and only mean that, in the Court’s view, the presumptions contained in that provision properly reflect the actual contractual relations between the parties to the transactions which the regulation governs. As for Article 28, it does not strictly reflect the actual contractual relations between the various parties to a supply of services, instead, it creates a legal fiction for VAT purposes.
The AG considered that all that Article 28 requires is that the taxable person acts on behalf of another person, but in his own name. Thus, the taxable person acts as himself in relation to the recipients of the service and determines his own rules for establishing and executing that legal relationship. He does not, however, undertake to provide the service and is not responsible for it, because in such a case he would be acting on his own behalf rather than on behalf of another person. Thus, the taxable person remains an intermediary between the actual service supplier and the recipient, and only for VAT purposes is the taxable person fictitiously assumed to be the service supplier.
The AG concluded that he had not been persuaded by the tax authority that Article 28 does not apply to the situation at issue in the immediate proceedings. The recipients of the service of making mobile applications available enter into contracts with the developers of those applications, and it is the developers who are responsible for the functioning of the applications. That is precisely what the taxable person (in this case, the app store) is doing on behalf of other persons (the application developers). If the app store entered into contracts with the persons to whom those applications are made available, and if it were responsible for their functioning, it would be acting on its own behalf rather than on behalf of the developers. The tax authorities reasoning would render that provision meaningless, because, according to that reasoning, the provision would regulate non-existent situations.
In this regard the AG considered the tax authorities arguments to be unconvincing; the app store acts on behalf of application developers by facilitating access to their applications, rather than entering into contracts directly with users. If the app store were responsible for the functioning of the applications, it would be acting on its own behalf. The app store manages the entire process of providing access to applications, setting uniform conditions for all available apps, and ensuring compatibility and security for a specific operating system.
In-app purchases also occur within the app store, reinforcing that the store operates on its own behalf. Customers download applications directly from the app store, without needing to engage with the developers, making the store the direct supplier. The store charges fees and confirms contracts, further solidifying its role as the service supplier.
The AG considered that the economic and technical realities of app stores align closely with the legal fiction established by Article 28. Therefore, prior to 1 January 2015, this provision should be interpreted as applicable to the electronic supply of mobile applications and additional services through app stores.
Considering the application of Article 9a in the context of the questions referred, the AG recalled that it establishes that intermediaries, such as app marketplaces, are presumed to act in their own name on behalf of another unless the actual supplier is explicitly identified. This presumption applies to electronically supplied services, and if certain conditions are met, it becomes irrebuttable. However, since Article 9a took effect on 1 January 2015, it cannot be applied to cases before that date.
The AG opined that the tax authority's argument that Article 28 should be interpreted differently for earlier periods should be rejected, as Article 9a merely specifies the implementation of Article 28 without altering its content. The Court has previously confirmed that the presumption in Article 9a does not change the nature of Article 28 but clarifies its application to electronically supplied services.
In the immediate case, the app store operator meets all conditions for the irrebuttable presumption, as it authorises the supply and charges customers. Therefore, before Article 9a's implementation, the app store is considered the supplier of mobile applications under Article 28, regardless of users knowing the developers' identities.
In summary on the first question referred, the AG considered that Article 28 should be interpreted as applying to the situation of the supply, prior to 1 January 2015, by electronic means, of services consisting in making available computer programs (mobile applications) and additional services through a portal (app store), with the result that a taxable person operating an app store is treated as if it had received those services from an application developer and supplied them to end users.
The AG moved on to consider the second question referred – whether Article 28 is to be interpreted as meaning that the place of supply of a fictitious service supplied by another person to a taxable person who takes part, under the conditions set forth in Article 28 thereof, in the supply of services to non-taxable persons resident in a Member State, is to be determined on the basis of Article 44 or Article 45.
In this regard the AG concluded that Article 28 must be interpreted as meaning that the place of supply of a fictitious service supplied by another person to a taxable person who takes part, under the conditions set forth Article 28 thereof, in the supply of services to non-taxable persons resident in a Member State, is to be determined on the basis of Article 44; in the immediate case Ireland.
Finally, the AG considered whether Article 203 of the VAT Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that another person on whose behalf a taxable person taking part in the supply of services under the conditions set forth in Article 28 acts is liable to pay VAT on the ground that the taxable person has designated that other person, with his consent, as the supplier of services and stated the amount of VAT in the purchase confirmations transmitted electronically to non-taxable end users.
The AG recalled that pursuant to Article 203, anyone who enters VAT on an invoice is obliged to pay the VAT. That provision seeks to eliminate the risk of loss of tax revenue which the right of deduction provided for by that directive might entail. That article therefore applies where VAT has been invoiced incorrectly and there is a risk of loss of tax revenue on account of the fact that the recipient of the invoice in question has the right to deduct such VAT.
Article 203 does not apply in a situation where there is no risk of loss of tax revenue on the ground that the invoices in question were issued to non-taxable persons who, by definition, have no right to deduct the VAT shown on those invoices. A similar situation exists in the immediate proceedings as the recipients of in-app purchases in applications such as games for mobile devices are, as a rule, consumers, and only in very exceptional cases could they be taxable persons acting as such. Therefore, there is no risk of loss of tax revenue associated with the right to deduct VAT incorrectly shown on an invoice, and Article 203 therefore does not apply.
The AG considered that the suggestion that that provision could be applied in the immediate proceedings because of the risk of loss of tax revenue caused by a negative jurisdictional dispute between the tax authorities in Germany and Ireland, as a result of which VAT will not ultimately be collected in either Member State, to be incorrect. Article 203 should be interpreted strictly, it is functionally linked to the right to deduct tax and serves, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, to avoid the risk of loss of tax revenue resulting from the deduction being overstated.
The AG recalled that whilst it is for Member States to take steps to ensure full collection of the VAT due in their territory, this does not justify the collection of tax in a Member State where it is not due and from a taxable person who is not obliged to pay it. In the immediate proceedings Xyrality has, in the AG’s opinion, correctly, albeit belatedly, determined its VAT liabilities, and it is up to the Member States concerned to take all necessary measures to collect that tax correctly.
In summary on this point, the AG opined that Article 203 must be interpreted as meaning that another person, on whose behalf a taxable person taking part in the supply of services under the conditions set forth in Article 28 acts, is not liable to pay VAT on the ground that the taxable person has designated that other person, with his consent, as the supplier of services and stated the amount of VAT in the purchase confirmations transmitted electronically to non-taxable end users.
In conclusion:
- Article 28, as amended by Council Directive 2008/8, must be interpreted as applying to the situation of the supply, prior to 1 January 2015, by electronic means, of services consisting in making available computer programs (mobile applications) and additional services through a portal (app store), with the result that a taxable person operating an app store is treated as if it had received those services from an application developer and supplied them to end users.
- Article 28 must be interpreted as meaning that the place of supply of a fictitious service supplied by another person to a taxable person who takes part, under the conditions set forth in Article 28, in the supply of services to non-taxable persons resident in a Member State, is to be determined on the basis of Article 44.
- Article 203 must be interpreted as meaning that another person on whose behalf a taxable person taking part in the supply of services under the conditions set forth in Article 28 acts, is not liable to pay VAT on the ground that the taxable person has designated that other person, with his consent, as the supplier of services and stated the amount of VAT in the purchase confirmations transmitted electronically to non-taxable end users.
Comments: This case was taken by EY Germany. For further information, please contact Bertrand Monfort or Daniela Bell. The VAT position for these supplies changed from 1 January 2015 with the introduction of Article 9a, however, whilst we await to see whether the Court follows the AG’s opinion, this is a good result for the taxpayer. Although the case is 10 years old, it could have impacted businesses that had failed to register and would have had to backdate VAT registration to the first sales.