Topics – Zero-rating, meaning of disabled person in the context of hair loss, services of adapting goods to suit condition
Mark Glenn Ltd
The Upper Tribunal (UT) has released its decision in this case concerning the VAT treatment of a system used to address hair loss. That system is called the Kinsey System, which is offered to women suffering from baldness (in the form of severe and patchy hair loss). The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) had previously been asked to consider whether the system qualified for zero-rating under Schedule 8, Group 12 (Drugs, medicines, aids for the disabled etc.), VATA94 or whether it should be standard-rated.
The FTT concluded that the hair replacement system did not qualify for zero-rating and dismissed Mark Glenn Ltd’s (MGL) appeal. MGL appealed to the UT on the grounds that the FTT erred in law in that its reasoning was inadequate or else otherwise flawed in various respects.
The grounds of appeal are:
- Ground 1: Failure to give reasons: The FTT did not explain why baldness in women was not a physical or mental impairment which had a long-term and substantial adverse effect on their ability to carry out everyday activities.
- Ground 2: Fiscal neutrality: The FTT erred in not properly considering that a wig being treated as zero-rated for VAT purposes, where the wig was in effect a less safe version of the Kinsey system, conflicted with the principle of fiscal neutrality.
- Ground 3: Adapting goods to suit his condition: The FTT erred in finding that the adapting of individual fibres into the mesh to specifically address the individual hair loss suffered, which was unique to each client’s hair loss, was not a supply to a disabled person of services of adapting goods to suit the disabled person’s condition.
- Ground 5: Edwards v Bairstow: The FTT’s conclusion that baldness in women was not a disability was one that no reasonable tribunal could have reached on the evidence.
Pursuant to Section 30 (Zero-rating) of VATA 1994, supplies of goods or services are zero-rated if the goods or services are of a description specified in Schedule 8. Group 12 (Drugs, medicines, aids for the disabled, etc) provides, inter alia:
- (2) the supply to a disabled person for domestic or his personal use, or to a charity for making available to disabled persons by sale or otherwise, for domestic or their personal use, of (a) medical or surgical appliances designed solely for the relief of a severe abnormality or severe injury; (g) equipment and appliances not included in paragraphs (a) to (f) designed solely for use by a disabled person; (h) parts and accessories designed solely for use in or with goods described in paragraphs (a) to (g).
- (3) The supply to a disabled person of services of adapting goods to suit his condition.
- (5) The supply to a disabled person or to a charity of a service of repair or maintenance of any goods specified in item 2, 2A, 6, 18 or 19 and supplied as described in that item.
Note (3) provides – any person who is chronically sick or disabled is ‘disabled’ for the purposes of this Group; note (4) provides – Item 2 shall not include aids (except hearing aids designed for auditory training of deaf children), dentures, spectacles and contact lenses but shall be deemed to include (a) clothing, footwear and wigs.
Ground 1: Failure to give reasons
The UT recalled that MGL argued that the FTT’s reasoning for concluding that female baldness was not a disability lacked reasoning, or at least any adequate reasoning. The FTT did not explain why medical and other evidence failed to meet the condition that significant hair loss in women was an impairment with a long-term and substantial adverse effect on their ability to carry out everyday activities. The FTT overlooked or unreasonably discounted evidence in the form of letters and NHS invoices, showing that hair loss conditions were medically treated and long-term. It did not explain why this evidence failed the impairment test. The FTT also failed to take judicial notice of the social reality – the rarity and stigma of female baldness compared to male baldness. That omission, MGL says, undermines the adequacy of reasons.
The UT recalled that ‘the duty to give reasons’ requires the decision-maker to expose reasoning sufficient to allow the parties and an appellate court to understand why the case was decided as it was. While a tribunal need not address every piece of evidence, it must confront the central submissions and key evidence that bear materially on the outcome.
The UT considered that in this respect, the FTT’s findings that significant hair loss or baldness in women is not an impairment, and in any event does not have long-term substantial adverse effects on everyday activities, were simply conclusions, not reasons. The UT suggested that whilst there is no doubt as to the FTT’s conclusion, the issue is the adequacy of the reasoning given. The FTT did not confront the central point of contention between the parties with respect to whether the severe hair loss at issue on the facts amounted to disability in and of itself.
The UT considered that the fact that hair loss can be a consequence of other conditions (or conversely that it might lead to mental conditions such as depression constituting a disability) does not, without more, answer the separate question whether the severe hair loss in women in question is, of itself, an impairment producing long-term substantial adverse effects.
While the FTT placed weight on the absence of evidence that the medical profession treats hair loss as a ‘chronic sickness’ the UT noted that MGL’s case was primarily on the ‘disability’ limb, connoting a physical impairment with a long-term substantial adverse effect. The FTT did not explain why this limb failed in light of MGL’s evidence (including NHS referral/funding, clinical narrative, and evidence of day-to-day limitations).
For these reasons, the UT concluded that Ground 1 is made out. The FTT’s reasoning for its conclusion that hair loss of the type treated with the Kinsey system in and of itself was not a disability did not constitute adequate reasoning that enabled the parties or this Tribunal to understand why MGL’s evidence did not make good the proposition that the recipients of the Kinsey system, who in each case were women who suffered from baldness (in the form of severe and patchy hair loss), were disabled as a result of such hair loss for the purposes of Item 3, Group 8, Schedule 12.
Ground 2: Fiscal Neutrality
The UT recalled that the principle of fiscal neutrality precludes treating similar goods and supplies of services, which are thus in competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes.
HMRC argued that the Kinsey system and wigs are not interchangeable for the average consumer. In agreement with HMRC, the UT considered that there was no error by the FTT, which correctly identified that while both products address hair loss, the evidence demonstrated that the Kinsey System was chosen precisely because it is different from a wig.
The UT concluded that the FTT correctly considered whether the supplies were sufficiently similar so as to require equivalent VAT treatment but found they were not. Ground 2 therefore must be dismissed.
Ground 3: The FTT erred in application of Item 3, Group 8, Schedule 12 VATA94
Under this ground it is argued the FTT erred in finding that the adapting of the hair fibres into a mesh to specifically address the individual hair loss was not a supply to a disabled person of services of adapting goods to suit the disabled person’s condition.
The UT recalled that the FTT did not find that hair loss in itself was a disability but considered that, in any case, to view the Kinsey system as a service of adapting goods would ‘dissect artificially’ what the system was. The FTT considered that the supply was one of a single supply of services which prevented the Kinsey system from being a service of adapting goods under Item 3.
The UT considered that the fact there was a single service did not preclude that service being viewed as one of adaptation of goods. That was not ‘artificial dissection’ but merely looking at the service to see whether it fulfilled the relevant description. HMRC was wrong to conclude that once the FTT found the overall supply to be one of services rather than goods, it was precluded from considering whether Item 3 applied on the basis that there was no supply of goods to which adaptation services could relate. The UT considered that a composite supply classified as a service may still involve goods as part of that supply.
The UT concluded that the FTT fell into error in its application of Item 3 by ruling out that item’s application on the misconceived basis that because it had found the overall supply was one of services that Item 3 could not therefore apply. That was clearly material and the FTT decision should accordingly be set aside in relation to this point because it excluded the service from consideration under Item 3, when if it had been considered, it was possible on the facts for Item 3 to be considered satisfied.
Ground 5: Edwards v Bairstow
MGL argued that the FTT’s conclusion that significant hair loss or baldness in women is not a disability was perverse. It argued that no reasonable tribunal could have reached that conclusion on the evidence.
HMRC argued that the FTT’s conclusion was within the reasonable bounds of what the FTT could decide on the evidence before it. It found no evidence that the medical profession treats hair loss as a chronic illness and concluded that hair loss does not substantially limit everyday activities.
The UT recalled that under Edwards v Bairstow, an appellate court may interfere with findings of fact where they are such that no reasonable tribunal, properly instructed, could have reached them.
The UT considered that the question of whether a given set of facts relating to a condition advanced as a disability do amount to a disability involves a question of evaluative judgment. The issue before the FTT was one on which differently constituted tribunals might reasonably arrive at different outcomes. While the UT concluded the FTTs’ reasoning was inadequate, it could not say that its conclusion that severe baldness in women was not of itself a disability was a conclusion that was one that no reasonable tribunal could have reached and therefore perverse. The UT therefore rejected this ground of appeal.
Set aside and remaking of the FTT decision
The UT considered that the errors of law under Ground 1 and Ground 3 were material errors of law, requiring the FTT decision to be set aside at least in respect of the analysis (or more accurately in respect of Ground 1 on inadequacy of reasoning) covered by those grounds.
Remaking the decision, the UT adopted the FTT’s findings regarding the clients to whom the treatment was provided, the severity of their hair loss, and the nature of the treatment provided. It also adopted the FTT’s conclusion that the supply was a supply of services rather than of goods.
The UT noted that the term ‘disability’ is not statutorily defined. The only additional assistance given in the legislation is that it includes someone who is chronically sick. The UT considered that the term should be given its ordinary meaning.
The UT considered that the question of whether a condition amounts to a disability should recognise that the impact of the condition may arise from the background social reality of how people with the condition are treated. HMRC’s purely physically based approach is too narrow when considering the impact of the condition. The assessment of the impact of disability should take full account of any real-world social context. To ignore the very real impacts a disfiguring condition might have on the everyday activity of someone seeking to go about the daily business of life, which will inevitably involve activity where one is visible to and required to interact with others, is to deny social reality.
The UT agreed that in the immediate case, judicial note should be taken of:
- The very deep impact of hair loss on women
- The cultural focus on women’s hair
- The rarity of women in the community with visible hair loss or baldness
The UT concluded that severe hair loss in women constitutes an impairment that adversely affects the ability to carry out everyday activities. These activities include work, leisure, socialising, self-care and caring for others; activities which, at least to some degree, involve being visible to others in public. This is not because hair loss physically prevents participation in such activities, but because of the distress that would ordinarily be experienced by a woman with severe hair loss if no steps were taken to conceal it. That distress arises from the cultural significance of hair to female identity, societal expectations regarding appearance, and the different standards applied to women. The women treated by MGL, those with baldness or patchy hair loss rather than mere thinning, were, by virtue of that condition, ‘disabled’ within the meaning of the legislation.
Applying the ordinary meaning of ‘disability’, the UT concluded that the severe hair loss suffered by the service recipients in this case constitutes a disability. It is therefore unnecessary to decide whether such hair loss could also be described as ‘chronic sickness’.
The UT stressed that its decision is confined to the facts of this case and to women who experienced baldness in the form of severe and patchy hair loss.
Considering whether MGL’s service can be described as that of adapting goods to suit the condition of the disabled person, the UT noted that the goods in question are the hairpiece and the strands of hair. It had no difficulty in describing the process, whereby the hairpiece and strands of hair are fitted and maintained, as one of adapting those goods to suit the condition of the ‘disabled person’ in circumstances where the condition is the lack of hair. The way in which the hairpiece is constructed, and it and the artificial hair strands are fixed, will vary according to the particular individual pattern of hair loss of the woman. The maintenance process included within the overall supply similarly involves adjusting the anchor points of the goods to make sure they fit with the remaining hair and can similarly be described as ‘adapting the goods’. Each of the supplies in question were therefore supplies which fell within the terms of Item 3, Group 12 and were therefore zero-rated.
Comments: The decision demonstrates the complexity around meeting specific conditions to obtain zero-rating. In this case, the Appellant met the conditions for a supply to a disabled person of services of adapting goods to suit their condition. Clients making similar supplies may wish to consider the decision further.
For further information, please contact Russell Moore.