What happened
As global governance becomes more fragmented, middle powers are acting to advance strategic interests wherever they can make headway. In addition to bilateral and alliance-based approaches (e.g., the recent Saudi Arabia-Türkiye-Pakistan agreement amid the conflict in the Middle East, covered in a later section below), multilateral forums increasingly reflect middle power ambitions. This month’s BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) Summit1 and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)2 offer the latest windows into how middle power approaches may evolve. Middle powers are not necessarily choosing BRICS over UNGA, or vice versa, but are instead operating across multiple forums simultaneously.
BRICS, a coalition of historically emerging markets formalized in 2006, expanded after 2023 from a five-member grouping into a broader coalition of 10 members and 10 partner countries. Despite debates about its effectiveness, the group’s recent growth reflects an interest in optionality among new and potential joiners, all of which are middle powers. It gathers for its 18th summit on 12-13 September, in India, the current BRICS chair.
The opening of the UNGA remains the sole global forum in which all countries regularly participate, taking place between 8-22 September at UN Headquarters in New York. Middle powers have reiterated their support for the UN’s multilateralism, if only out of self-interest as they push for reforms that would gain them greater influence within the institution. As the final UNGA meeting before the election of a new UN Secretary-General for the 2027-2032 term, candidates will be pitching for a role in the transformation of the UN to keep it relevant in the long term. Efforts such as 2024’s UN Pact for the Future3 and discussions around AI governance and development finance provide middle powers with emerging opportunities to shape the UN’s direction.
What’s next
As middle powers pursue influence across multiple global forums, companies may face a less standardized global operating environment across finance, technology and economic governance.
First is finance and, especially, influence on capital flows. Within BRICS, the focus is on potential systems outside of the current financial architecture dominated by the US and the US dollar. Ongoing discussions include aspirations regarding new methods for cross-border payments and opposing unilateral sanctions (although UN-authorized sanctions are exempted). The UN track is more concerned with access to finance within pre-existing mechanisms, including loan terms, global tax norms and development finance.
Middle powers are also seeking to retain sovereignty around emerging technologies – mirroring efforts by the great powers. For BRICS countries, as elsewhere, a priority is to retain digital sovereignty and avoid dependence on foreign providers. BRICS is no unified bloc in this respect, as members differ widely in capability and China’s lead in AI and compute complicates any shared push for independence. India illustrates the national-level response: its “Sovereign AI” initiative aims to expand domestic AI infrastructure and promote indigenous capabilities. Efforts at the UN are focused on a shared governance framework around AI and digital cooperation, both to ensure that middle powers do not get left behind in the AI race and to preserve flexibility around technology governance at the country level.
As trade rules, tax guidelines and economic institutions change, middle powers are seeking governance changes at the IMF, World Bank and WTO. The UN similarly prioritizes reform at multilateral financial institutions, indicating an ongoing push for more representation of middle powers in the new economic order.